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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a model as a foundation for het-
erogeneous services, therefore unifying web services tech-
nologies in SOA (Service Oriented Architecture), specif-
ically, SOAP/WS* and RESTful models. This model ab-
stracts away from service implementations, in order to verify
and to enforce some important security properties.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D2.4 [Software Engi-
neering]: Software/Program Verification—Correctness proofs,
Formal methods, Model checking, Programming by con-
tract, Validation; D3.1 [Programming Languages]: Formal
Definitions and Theory—Semantics, Syntax; D.3.3 [Pro-
gramming Languages]: Language Constructs and Features—
Abstract data types, Concurrent programming structures,
Constraints, Data types and structure, Input/output, Recur-
sion
General Terms Design , Languages, Security, Standard-
ization, Verification
Keywords Formal Methods, Security, Reference Monitors,
Aspects, Service-Oriented Architecture
1. Motivation
Service-based applications can be built according to the
two most competing technologies: WS* and RESTful. Both
have similar characteristics but architectural decisions and
targeted applications are different, [8]. Today, SOAP/WS*
and RESTful models are often supported at the same time:
e.g., SAP AG’s Business ByDesign product is based on the
SOAP/WS* model, while its Gateway product supports the
composition of RESTful services. In such a heterogeneous
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system, a unified model has an importance in controlling
exchanged messages.
Actually, despite the differences between WS* and REST-
ful technologies, we can unify them under similar concepts:
distributed agents are built by means of interacting dis-
tributed services that are composed in a black-box manner
using well-defined service interfaces. These agents provide
services while requiring other services that are consumed.
Such a global abstraction based on the notion of black-
boxes for SOA technologies provides significant benefits
for the management of distributed services, notably their
security properties that can be specified through contracts at
the interaction level. Despite the existing security standards,
some very skilled attacks are still discovered. Most of these
attacks are due to weaknesses in security policies. Hence,
the verification of security contracts becomes a fundamental
need in SOA environments. Security vulnerabilities appear
at different levels. Here, we are only interested in security
control at the message exchanges level.
2. Background and related work
A wide variety of formal models exists for service-oriented
computing. Two distinguished approaches of formalization
are presented: process calculus models for expressing and
analyzing service based-systems, [10], or models for giving
a formal semantic for a standard orchestration language, like
BPEL, [7]. The drawback of these orchestration models is
that they present a service implementation formalism for lo-
cal processes description, which complicates the model with
multiple communication rules. While verifying some impor-
tant security properties, like access control on services, con-
fidentiality on transmitted data and authentication for access
rights, does not require such complex models. Instead, a sim-
ple model hiding the local implementation details is more
adequate for security control mediating message exchanges.
Such a model is called black-box model, like [9].
Regarding works on formal treatment of security proper-
ties for service-based systems and their enforcement, they
occupy a big part of the state of the art, like in [3, 4, 6].
In these models, the security control is tightly linked to the
concrete implementation and to the used language. Conse-
quently, approaches of the former classes are often subject to
the problem that they may not well support enforcement of
security properties due to the gap of abstraction between the
formal model and concrete implementations, [3]. Such con-
straint is inadequate with the language-independent (loosely
coupling) property in SOA for security enforcement. Based
on black-box models, security control could be provided by
a wrapper monitor, like in [5].
3. Approach and uniqueness
According to a global contract, each partner in a communi-
cation deduces by projection a specification of the function-
alities that it must locally implement. Of course, all these
projections must ensure that the local functionalities, once
gathered, effectively collaborate to realize the global con-
tract. For each partner, it remains to realize the projection, by
a local implementation. The ANR project CESSA [1] aims
at tackling this synthesis problem, following a top-down ap-
proach, from descriptions to realizations. This project seeks
an abstract framework for reasoning about security proper-
ties of SOA based web services, independently from imple-
mentation details. Thus, we distinguish two parts:
• First, we seek a formal model for service-oriented com-
puting that enables to simplify the expression of fundamen-
tal security properties. In accordance with black-box models,
we seek a message-passing model, like [9].
• Second, a security model must be built over the first
one to apply security contracts at message exchanges level.
For that, we seek a new notion of distributed reference mon-
itors which assure to maintain the projected contract on the
local encapsulated agent. Implementation of such monitors
would be by using aspects language.
4. Results and contributions
Here we briefly describe our contribution on the first part
of CESSA, the functional formal model. We have a simple
formal model hiding the local details which makes it inde-
pendent from implementation languages used for describing
processes execution. With such a black-box model, the com-
munication level over the network is abstracted with three
main rules: (i) [LOC]: abstracts local executions that con-
sume incoming messages and produce messages to be sent
over the network; (ii) [OUT]: enables the passage of a mes-
sage throughout the agent interface to the network; and (iii)
[IN]: enables the receipt of a message from the network to
the designated agent throughout its interface.
Figure 1 illustrates our formal model compared to the two
technologies: WS* and RESTful. Our model is message-
based with a chemical semantic, [2]. Web services are
viewed as abstract agents exchanging messages via the net-
work. Services are available thanks to the notion of commu-
nication channels. Messages can carry channels, thus ensur-
Figure 1. Relationship between WS*/RESTful and our for-
mal model
ing full channel mobility. This model supports a sound type
system avoiding type-based communication errors.
Future work will demonstrate that this model is able to
cope with service contracts, when they are based on the
content of messages, especially security contracts. Security
policies will be defined using our specific language, CSPL
(CESSA Security Policy Language), [1].
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